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LABOR’S MANY CONSTITUTIONS (AND 
CAPITAL’S TOO)  
Eric Tucker† 
The movement to constitutionalize collective labor rights is growing as 
rapidly as organized labor’s economic and political strength is eroding. 
This is not surprising.  In an era in which organized labor enjoyed 
significant bargaining power and had the capacity to influence labor law, 
labor market policy, and macroeconomic policy more generally, there was 
no need to find ways to limit the ways states could legislate with respect to 
collective labor rights.  It is precisely the loss of labor’s power and the shift 
from a Keynesian or social democratic agenda, which supported collective 
bargaining as a macroeconomic policy, to a neoliberal agenda, which sees 
labor rights as market impeding, that has motivated efforts to put labor 
rights beyond the reach of ordinary government action.  
There is already a large body of academic work addressing the 
constitutionalization of labor rights and so there is some burden on any one 
adding to it to justify their intervention.  My goal in this Article is to 
explore three issues that have not been adequately addressed.  First, there is 
a need to unpack, at a conceptual level, two distinct dimensions of 
collective labor rights, their thickness, and their hardness.  I will elaborate 
on these further, but briefly by thickness I refer to the substantive content of 
labor rights, and by hardness I refer to their enforceability.  These 
dimensions of labor rights have not been extensively considered because 
most writers have a pretty fixed idea of both.  Collective labor rights are 
built around the principle of freedom of association and include the right to 
form unions, to bargain collectively and to strike and constitutional labor 
rights are legally enforceable.  My goal here is to disrupt this settled 
understanding and provide a different analytical lens that allows us see and 
think more broadly about labor rights and how they are constitutionalized. 
Second, I want to open up a discussion about the different geographic 
scales at which labor rights are being constitutionalized.  For the most part, 
† Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario.  This Article originated as a 
response to a paper by Ruth Dukes given at the Voices at Work workshop.  I want to thank Ruth for her 
stimulating paper.  I benefited from comments by workshop participants as well as from Harry 
Glasbeek, Judy Fudge, and Brian Ray.   
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the literature addresses them separately.  For example, Canadian labor 
rights are discussed at the national level under the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1 (Charter), at the regional level under the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation2 (NAALC), and at the international level, 
through the International Labor Organization3 (ILO).  They are not usually 
considered together as a constitutionalizing structure.  My goal here is to do 
precisely that so that we can better see the relationships between the 
different geographic scales and instruments through which the 
constitutionalization project is being pursued. 
Finally, I want to put the project of constitutionalizing labor rights into 
the context of other constitutionalization projects that are also being 
actively pursued.  While other writers have emphasized the salience of the 
neoliberal political-economic context for the development of 
constitutionalized labor rights, there has not been a discussion that 
compares the constitutionalization of labor rights with the 
constitutionalization of a neoliberal order.  Not only does this comparison 
emphasize the significance of the neoliberal context in which the labor 
rights constitutionalization project is being pursued, but by comparing the 
hardness and thickness of the two constitutionalization projects at their 
different geographic scales we can better appreciate the ways in which these 
two projects shape and are shaped by each other. 
Before turning to these issues, however, it is necessary to clarify the 
term constitutionalization, because there may be some controversy over 
what properly fits within its parameters.  Martin Loughlin recently defined 
the term as “the attempt to subject all governmental action within a 
designated field to the structures, processes, principles and values of a 
‘constitution.’”4  This formulation self-consciously recognizes the difficulty 
of defining a constitution and Loughlin spends some time talking about the 
evolution of constitutions and constitutional arrangements, as well as their 
ideological content.  For our purposes, there are two key issues that need to 
be sorted out.  First, Loughlin contrasts a republican notion of 
constitutionalism with a liberal one.  In the former, government action is 
contained through the creation of institutional arrangements that provide for 
limited government.  The classic form is the U.S. system of checks and 
1. Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11. 
2. North American Agreement on Labor Corporation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
605.  
3. The ILO is the international organization responsible for drawing up and overseeing
international labor standards.  For its history, see ANTHONY EVELYN ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (1971).   
4. Martin Loughlin, What Is Constitutionalisation, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 47,
47 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010). 
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balances through which political power is institutionally divided.  The 
alternative, liberal constitutionalism, casts the constitution as a set of 
positive laws that are enforced by judicial bodies. 
These different approaches to constitutionalization are reflected in the 
contrasting views of Otto Kahn-Freund and Hugo Sinzheimer.  For Kahn-
Freund, the optimal way to institutionalize labor rights was by embedding 
them in labor market institutions and practices, while Sinzheimer sought to 
have them positively juridified in Germany’s Weimar constitution.5  Our 
concern here is not which of these approaches is preferable for the purposes 
of advancing labor rights, but rather what we count as constitutionalization. 
Loughlin, I think, correctly observes that in contemporary practice, 
“especially when harnessed to the socio-economic forces that have been 
driving recent government changes (i.e., liberalization, marketization, 
globalization. . . . [c]onstitutionalisation refers to the processes by which an 
increasing range of public life is being subjected to the discipline of the 
norms of liberal-legal constitutionalism.”6  Therefore, for the purposes of 
this paper, we adopt Loughlin’s definition of constitutionalization. 
The second key issue is the contrast between domestic 
constitutionalization and supranational constitutionalization.  The project of 
national constitutionalization is an old one although in many countries, like 
Canada, it has been deepened in recent decades by the triumph of the 
liberal-legal model.  During this period of national constitutional 
development, there has also been a growth in supranational 
constitutionalism, which has two aspects according to Loughlin.  The first 
involves the constitutionalization of transnational bodies themselves while 
the second is the emergence of networks of transnational governance that 
have eroded the foundational elements of national constitutionalism.7  With 
regard to the latter, Loughlin is reluctant to label phenomena like the 
legalization of World Trade Organization (WTO) enforcement processes as 
constitutional, or at least sees this characterization as highly speculative. 
Others share his view.8  Notwithstanding these considered objections, for 
our purposes it is useful to think of both these developments as aspects of 
constitutionalization.  First, the distinction that Loughlin draws between the 
constitutionalization of institutions and governance networks is arguably 
not as sharp as he makes it out to be.  While the WTO is not the same as the 
EU, it is a governance institution whose purpose is to constrain government 
5. Ruth Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employment Relations:  Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the
Role of Labour Law, 35 J. L. & SOC’Y 341, 343 (2008). 
6. Louglin, supra note 4, at 61.
7. Id. at 63–64.
8. In addition to the authors footnoted by Loughlin, id., see MARC D. FROESE, CANADA AT THE
WTO 9–11 (2010). 
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action in ways that are not easily ignored or undone.  David Schneiderman 
has forcefully argued that the investor rules regime is constitution-like in 
that “[i]t has the object of placing legal limits on the authority of 
government, isolating economic power from political power, and assigning 
investor interests the highest possible protection.”9  Second, our focus here 
is not on the question of whether labor or capital rights are fully 
constitutionalized, but rather how far the projects of constitutionalization 
have advanced.  Therefore, even if it is correct to say that supranational 
constitutionalization is incomplete and contested, it still remains important 
to analyze the project itself. 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  First, it briefly discusses the 
thickness and hardness dimensions of labor’s constitution.  Second, it uses 
these two dimensions to map labor’s constitution at the national, regional, 
and international geographic scales.  At the same time, it also maps 
capital’s constitution.  Finally, the Article comes back briefly to suggest 
ways in which this comparative mapping approach can help us think more 
clearly about the challenges that lie ahead for the project of 
constitutionalizing labor rights. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL MAPPING 
For the purposes of mapping labor’s constitution, I think it will be 
useful to focus on three of its dimensions.  The first builds on the distinction 
that Ruth Dukes identifies between a thin conception of labor’s constitution, 
focused on freedom of association and collective bargaining, and a thicker 
one, such as Sinzheimer’s, that encompasses fundamental socioeconomic 
arrangements, such as those governing management and control of the 
means of production, and the political rules and institutional arrangements 
that shape the power resources of labor and capital.  In this thicker view, 
labor’s constitution is part and parcel of an economic constitution that 
creates and supports economic democracy.10  The focus here, then, is on the 
thickness of labor’s constitution, particularly as it relates to rights 
associated with workers’ voice, although in other contexts we could extend 
this dimension to other aspects of labor’s constitution, such as the extent to 
which it requires or prioritizes socioeconomic arrangements that support a 
human capabilities or human development project.11 
9. DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 4 (2008).
10. Ruth Dukes, Hugo Sinzheimer and the Constitutional Function of Labour Law, in THE IDEA OF
LABOUR LAW 57, 58–61 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011). 
11. For a neo-Fabian approach that builds on Amartya Sen’s work, see SIMON DEAKIN & FRANK
WILKINSON, THE LAW OF THE LABOUR MARKET (2005).  For a Marxist approach, see MICHAEL A. 
LEBOWITZ, THE SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE: REAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2010). 
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A second dimension of constitutionalization that Dukes also addresses 
is its hardness or softness.  She raises this in the context of her discussion of 
Articles 159 and 165 of the Weimar Constitution.  Article 159 contained a 
thinner set of labor rights focused on the protection of freedom of 
association, while Article 165 purported to constitutionalize economic 
democracy.  Weimar courts treated Article 159 as hard juridical law, but 
read Article 165 as an aspirational declaration whose realization depended 
upon legislative implementation that never materialized.   
A third dimension of labor’s constitution is its geographic scale.  Here 
we can construct a continuum between national or even subnational 
political units on one end, expanding to regional and then to global 
institutions at the other.  The growth of labor’s transnational constitution is 
a twentieth century story that has been told elsewhere.12  Although it is 
arguably the case that the regional and global scale of labor’s constitution 
was insignificant in the first half of the twentieth century, they cannot be 
ignored at the turn of the twenty-first.  
If we start running these three dimensions together, the necessity to 
talk about labor’s many constitutions becomes clearer.  More importantly, I 
hope this way of mapping helps us to navigate our way through the 
enormous complexity and difficulty of the current labor 
constitutionalization project.  However, before trying to demonstrate this 
through a discussion of Canada’s labor constitution, I want to raise one 
further complication: while we are focused on labor’s constitution, it is 
crucial that we do not ignore other constitutionalization projects that are 
simultaneously being pursued and that may be antithetical to the realization 
of labor’s constitution, thickly or thinly conceived.  This concern has 
become more important in recent decades given the growing disjuncture 
between the partial constitutionalization of thin labor rights and the rise of 
what some have characterized as “the new constitutionalism,”13 which has 
enhanced and anchored the power of capital by putting property and 
contract beyond the reach of local or national state interference, as part of 
larger project of creating a neoliberal social structure of accumulation 
(SSA).14  
 
 12. For a brief overview, see BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 25–67 (2005). 
 13. Stephen Gill, Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism, 24 
MILLENNIUM:  J. INT’L STUD. 399 (1995); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY:  THE ORIGINS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).  See also Judy Fudge, Constitutionalizing 
Labour Rights in Europe, in THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 244 (Tom Campbell et al. 
eds.,  2011) (exploring this paradox in the European context). 
 14. Social structure of accumulation theory emphasizes the role of political and cultural 
institutions, as well as economic ones, that support capitalist accumulation.  A recent collection 
elaborates on the rise of a neoliberal social structure of accumulation since the 1980s.  See 
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM AND ITS CRISES (Terrence McDonagh et al. eds., 2010). 
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Not only is there a disjuncture between these two projects, but many 
argue that at the thicker levels of constitutionalization the tide is strongly 
running in favor of capital’s constitution.15  It is difficult to think of a 
jurisdiction where a thick conception of labor rights, embracing economic 
democracy and prioritizing human development, has been strengthened 
over this period, while there are many where, to the extent that these 
arrangements existed, they have been weakened and the “new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism” has been more firmly 
entrenched.16  The result is a vicious circle.  A neoliberal social structure of 
accumulation is partially constituted by the success of capital’s 
constitutionalization project and the success of that project is favored by 
power of capital within that social structure.  The project of 
constitutionalizing labor rights pushes in the opposite direction, but does so 
under adverse social, economic and constitutional conditions, whether we 
think of the project as a defensive one that aims to preserve some space for 
workers’ voice and associational rights within a neoliberal regime or as part 
of a larger transformative strategy that aims to constitutionalize a different 
and more democratic regime of accumulation. 
II. LABOR’S AND CAPITAL’S CONSTITUTIONS: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Rather than elaborate in this short response on the mapping elements, 
it will be more productive to put them to work in a particular context, 
Canada.  I start from the national scale, asking first about the hardness and 
thickness of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ protection of 
freedom of association in s. 2(d).  Clearly, this is hard, judicially 
enforceable law.  It is, however, thin: freedom of association under the 
 
 15. For example, Stephen McBride, The New Constitutionalism:  International and Private Rule in 
the New Global Order, in RELATIONS OF GLOBAL POWER:  NEOLIBERAL ORDER AND DISORDER 19 
(Gary Teeple & Stephen McBride eds., 2011); David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New 
Constitutionalism, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 757 (2000);  Stephen Gill, The Constitution of Global 
Capitalism, THE GLOBAL SITE (2000), http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/ 010gill.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2012). 
 16. Gill, ibid. at 1.  We might think here of Swedish social democracy and the reversal of 
economic democracy initiatives, such as the Meidner Plan, since the 1970s.  See Jonas Pontusson, 
Radicalization and Retreat in Swedish Social Democracy, 163 NEW LEFT REV. 15 (1987).  On the other 
end of the spectrum is South Africa, which has one of the most progressive constitutions in regards to 
the protection of social rights.  There is much controversy over the effectiveness of the court in 
enforcing these rights, but regardless of one’s position the fact remains that the realization of social 
rights runs against the current of neoliberal economic policies.  Economic inequality has intensified, so 
that South Africa is now is one of the most unequal societies in the world, where average life expectancy 
is just 51.5 years.  MARC KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS 243–75 (2009); Brian 
Ray, Engagement’s Possibilities and Limits As a Socioeconomic Rights Remedy, 9 WASH. UNIV. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 399 (2010); Sam Ashman, Ben Fine & Susan Newman, The Crisis in South 
Africa:  Neoliberalism, Financialization and Uneven and Combined Development, in SOCIALIST 
REGISTER 2011: THE CRISIS THIS TIME (Leo Panitch, Gregory Albo & Vivek Chibber eds.), 
http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/issue/view/1097 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012). 
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Charter does not support economic democracy in the Sinzheimer sense, nor 
much that might be said to prioritize human development over other 
objectives.  The thinness of labor rights under the Charter is often 
overlooked because conventional understandings of labor rights in Canada 
take this thinness for granted and instead focus on the questions that get 
litigated and the movement of the court within this limited range.  Thus in 
the context of freedom of association, we have closely followed the 
evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence, beginning with 
the Labor Trilogy,17 which excluded collective bargaining and the right to 
strike from freedom association, to Health Services,18 which decisively 
broke with the Trilogy and recognized a constitutional right to bargain 
collectively, to Fraser,19 which seemingly signals a retreat that leaves in 
place the constitutional right but arguably scales back its meaning to a duty 
to consult and raises the evidentiary burden for vulnerable workers who 
want to argue that current law fails to satisfy the state’s constitutional duty 
to enable them to meaningfully exercise their associational rights.20  While 
this focus is understandable, any global assessment of Canadian labor’s 
national constitution and the project of its advancement through litigation 
should not lose sight of its limited reach. 
The formal constitutionalization of labor rights must also be 
considered against the background of the competing neoliberal 
constitutionalization project underway in Canada.  It is has been argued, for 
example, that the Charter itself does more to advance this neoliberal project 
than it does to protect labor and social rights.  Of course, it must be noted 
that unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Canadian Charter does not protect 
property rights.  As has been widely noted, however, the Charter is at its 
core a liberal document that is focused on the dangers of unchecked public 
power, largely ignoring the dangers of unchecked private power.  State 
support for private property is not contestable, but state restrictions are, 
albeit indirectly.  Corporations have used the Charter to protect their 
economic interests by challenging laws that limit commercial or political 
speech or that attempt to impose absolute liability for regulatory offences.  
 
 17. Reference re Pub. Serv. Emps. Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PSAC v. Canada, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460. 
 18. Health Serv. & Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n. v. British Columbia, [2007] 2 
S.C.R. 391. 
 19. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
 20. For a useful summaries of the development of labor rights prior to Fraser, see Michael 
MacNeil, Collective Bargaining in the Shadow of the Charter Cathedral: Union Strategies in a Post 
B.C. Health World, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1739392; Judy Fudge, Brave 
New Words:  Labour, the Courts and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 28 WINDSOR 
YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 23 (2010).  For a critical discussion of Fraser, see CONSTITUTIONAL 
LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA:  FARM WORKERS AND THE FRASER CASE (Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & 
Eric Tucker eds., 2012). 
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Property owners are also constitutionally protected from state restrictions 
that interfere with their ability to put their property to constitutionally 
protected uses.  This is one of the reasons why it is much more difficult to 
successfully argue that the state owes a positive duty to protect labor 
organizing or to require collective bargaining than it is to challenge laws 
that restrict economic activity.21 
A second but less noted path of neoliberal constitutionalization in 
Canada is through the deepening of free trade federalism,22 by which we 
mean the removal of interprovincial barriers to trade.  The starting point in 
Canada under the Constitution Act is one in which a great deal of labor and 
capital mobility is protected.  For example, there are no tariffs on 
interprovincial trade and individuals are free to choose where they live and 
work in Canada.  Under the division of powers, however, provinces have 
regulatory powers that can produce differences in standards among the 
provinces that may negatively affect interprovincial trade and labor 
mobility.  Whether these differences should be viewed as undesirable 
barriers to trade or the legitimate expression of local preferences however is 
more of a normative question than an economic one and a move to limit 
local decision-making capacity is arguably best understood as part of the 
advancement of a neoliberal SSA.23 
Deepening the constitutionalization of internal free trade is a project 
that has been developing over the past twenty years, although it has 
occurred largely out of the public eye and with little fanfare.  The 
negotiation of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) in 1995 was 
motivated by the strengthening of the free-trade agenda as expressed in the 
successful negotiation of the Canada- U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1988 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992.  Without going 
into details, it requires each province to “give up, lessen, or discipline itself 
in using” governing capacities it previously enjoyed in the name of 
promoting liberalized interprovincial trade.24  The AIT specifies broad 
principles that include “non-discrimination, rights of entry to or exit from 
provincial markets, that new provincial policies not create obstacles to 
 
 21. There is a vast literature on the subject.  For starters, see ANDREW PETTER, THE POLITICS OF 
THE CHARTER:  THE ILLUSIVE PROMISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2010); Gavin W. Anderson, 
Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism, 17 CAN. J. L. & JURISP. 31 (2004); JOEL 
BAKAN, JUST WORDS (1997); MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF 
POLITICS IN CANADA (revised ed. 1994). 
 22. G. BRUCE DOERN & MARK MACDONALD, FREE-TRADE FEDERALISM:  NEGOTIATING THE 
CANADIAN AGREEMENT ON INTERNAL TRADE (1999). 
 23. Mark Lee, Investor Rights and Canadian Federalism:  The Case of TILMA, 82 STUD. IN POL. 
ECON. 85 (2008). 
 24. DOERN & MACDONALD, supra note 22, at 154. 
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trade, [and] that barriers due to differences in standards be reconciled.”25  
Deviations from these objectives are permitted provided they can be 
justified by “legitimate” objectives.26  The dispute resolution mechanism 
emphasizes the promotion of negotiated settlements but where these fail a 
panel is established and makes a report.  The report, however, cannot be 
legally enforced and in the last instance retaliatory action can be taken by a 
province against another where there has been a failure to implement panel 
findings.  In reality, however, the 1995 dispute resolution mechanism was 
soft.27 
Because of its perceived weakness, those favoring free-trade 
federalism have pursued measures for its constitutionalization by thickening 
and hardening investor rights.  They have met with some success.  First, in 
2006, British Columbia and Alberta signed the Trade, Investment, and 
Labor Mobility Agreement (TILMA), which imposes stronger limits on 
provincial government action and gives investors a direct right to challenge 
provincial and municipal laws and regulations that arguably violate the 
agreement.  Private panels hear such complaints and have the power to 
award $5 million in penalties.  The monetary liability of governments, 
however, may not be capped at this amount if a measure offends several 
sections of TILMA or if other investors make similar complaints.28  Alberta 
and British Columbia hoped that other provinces would sign onto the 
agreement, but that did not occur.  In July 2008, however, the provincial 
premiers agreed to amend the AIT dispute resolution procedure to empower 
AIT panels to impose a monetary penalty where a province has failed to 
comply.  The size of the penalty is to be calculated based on several factors, 
including the seriousness of the “inconsistency” and the magnitude of its 
impact, but an annex limits the amount based on the size of the province, 
the maximum being $5 million.29  This provision only applied to 
government to government complaints, but in the summer of 2011 the 
Canadian and provincial governments announced their willingness to be 
sued by private parties.30 
One might argue that the AIT and TILMA are not part of Canada’s 
formal constitution, but it is beyond dispute that they serve a similar 
function, which is to bind the state’s power in ways that are difficult to 
undo.  Moreover, these agreements entrench a neoliberal SSA, which is 
 
 25.  John Whalley, Disciplining Canada’s Interprovincial Barriers:  The Subnational WTO 
Approach As Another Option with or beyond an Extended TILMA, 35 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 315, 320 (2009). 
 26. Id. 
 27. DOERN & MACDONALD, supra note 22, at 137–40; Whalley, supra note 25, at 320–21. 
 28. Lee, supra note 23, at 99–100. 
 29. Agreement on Internal Trade, §§ 1701 (11)(b), 1707.1, Annex 1707.1(2). 
 30. Erin Weir, TILMA by stealth, RABBLE CA. (Jul. 16, 2011), http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/ 
progressive-economics-forum/2011/07/tilma-stealth (last visited Apr. 6, 2012). 
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essentially what Harry Arthurs means when he speaks of Canada’s “real” 
constitution as juxtaposed from its “formal” one.31  The problem, as Arthurs 
sees it, is that even with an expansion of labor’s formal constitutional rights 
to include collective bargaining and even potentially the freedom to strike, 
very little will be accomplished when those rights must be applied in the 
context of an advancing neoliberal regime of accumulation, entailing the 
deregulation of business, privatization of what were formerly state 
enterprises and responsibilities, and the globalization of production.  The 
deepening constitutionalization of such a regime makes the achievement of 
meaningful constitutionalized labor rights that much more difficult.32 
Moving to the regional geographic scale, the most significant regional 
instrument addressing labor rights is the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a side accord to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Starting from the dimension of thickness, it 
would be fair to say that NAALC’s labor constitution is thicker than the 
Charter’s.  The eleven labor principles identified in the instrument not only 
include freedom of association, and particularly, the right to organize and to 
bargain collectively, but also the right to strike, a right which has not been 
recognized under the Charter.33  In addition, the labor principles address 
forced labor, child labor, minimum standards, employment discrimination, 
equal pay, occupational health and safety, workers’ compensation, and 
migrant workers, all of which are addressed by Canadian statutory law, 
some of which, like human rights codes, have a quasi-constitutional 
status.34 
Apart from the question of whether the labor rights in the NAALC are 
thicker than those in the domestic Canadian labor constitution, it is clear 
that the NAALC does not entrench a labor constitution of worker voice in 
the economy as thick as the one Sinzheimer proposed.  Indeed, when we 
focus on the broader dimension of the social structure of accumulation, we 
 
 31. Harry W. Arthurs, Labour and the ‘Real’ Constitution, 48 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 43, 61 
(2007). 
 32. Private sector union densities have been declining for years and reached a new modern low in 
2010 of 17.5%.  Public sector union densities have fared better, but public sector collective bargaining 
rights have been under attack.  The most recent example of this was the Federal government’s 
legislation ending the lockout of post workers, which was particularly regressive, even by the standards 
of back-to-work laws, in that it not only imposed a multi-year wage settlement, but did so at a level 
lower than what Canada Post had been offering at the time of the lock-out.  Restoring Mail Delivery for 
Canadians Act, S.C. 2011, c. 17.  For a more general overview of attacks of labor rights, see LEO 
PANITCH & DONALD SWARTZ, FROM CONSENT TO COERCION:  THE ASSAULT ON TRADE UNION 
FREEDOMS (3d ed. 2003). 
 33. See Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, The Freedom to Strike in Canada:  A Brief Legal History, 15 
CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 333–53 (2010). 
 34. For a discussion of these more individualized rights, see Christian Brunelle, The Growing 
Impact of Human Rights on Canadian Labour Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK:  PERSPECTIVES ON 
LAW AND REGULATION 119 (Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz eds., 2010). 
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can see that NAFTA is better understood as part of the new 
constitutionalism entrenching disciplinary neoliberalism by strengthening 
investor and property rights, or as Grinspun and Kreklewich described it, a 
conditioning framework consolidating neoliberal reforms.35  Indeed, it is a 
measure that has promoted the spatialization of production, which has the 
effect of weakening labor by putting it under the threat that production will 
be relocated elsewhere.36  Moreover, it is no secret that the NAALC was 
negotiated as a result of political pressure on incoming President Clinton to 
create a mechanism that might provide some amelioration against the 
negative impact of free trade arrangements on U.S. labor.  That is, in its 
best light the NAALC is a sidecar attached to a very different constitutional 
project running in the opposite direction.37  
Finally, remaining at the regional level, there is the question of the 
NAALC’s hardness or softness.  Much of the NAALC is soft.  It aims to 
promote the advancement of its labor principles in each jurisdiction and to 
facilitate cooperation between the three parties through a commission and 
secretariat.38  There is no hard law requirement for the signatories to 
implement the labor principles and no mechanism to complain about their 
failure to do so.  Rather, complaints are limited to the failure of a signatory 
to enforce whatever law in relation to the eleven labor principles that it has 
on the books.  The complaint process is three tiered.  Complaints are 
initially made to one of the National Administrative Offices (NAO).  At the 
first tier the NAO that receives the complaint conducts a review, which may 
include public hearings, and issues a report. Ministerial consultations may 
follow.  To date, no complaint has gone further than the first tier if for no 
other reason that the complainant loses carriage of the complaint and only 
one of the ministers has the power to push the complaint to tier 2.  This is 
not a step that has been in any country’s interest.  For our purposes, 
however, it is important to note that complaints about freedom of 
association, collective bargaining and strikes cannot proceed beyond the 
first tier.  Only complaints about the failure to enforce the eight so-called 
 
 35. See generally Ricardo Grinspun & Robert Kreklewich, Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: 
‘Free Trade’ As a Conditioning Framework, 43 STUD. POL. ECON. 33 (1994).  See also David 
Schneiderman, NAFTA’s Takings Rule:  American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46 UNIV. 
TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996); Stephen McBride, Quiet Constitutionalism in Canada:  The International 
Political Economy of Domestic Institutional Change, 36 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 251 (2003). 
 36. Michael Wallace & David Brady, Globalization or Spatialization?  The Worldwide Spatial 
Restructuring of the Labor Process, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM AND ITS CRISES:  SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF ACCUMULATION THEORY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 121 (Terrence McDonough et al. eds., 
2010).  See also Eric Tucker, Great Expectations Defeated?:  The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining 
Regimes in Canada and the U.S. post-NAFTA, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2005). 
 37. NORMAN CAULFIELD, NAFTA AND LABOR IN NORTH AMERICA (2010). 
 38. Based on a recent visit to the website http://www.naalc.org/coop-activities.htm%20 (27 June, 
2010), it appears that apart from some publications, there is little ongoing activity in this area. 
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“technical labour standards” can go to the second tier, and of those only 
three, child labor, minimum wages, and health and safety can proceed to the 
third, where sanctions can be imposed.  It is notable that a state’s failure to 
enforce whatever “voices at work” laws it has on the books is the most 
weakly protected.39 
Even though the NAALC is, for all practical purposes, soft law that 
does not preclude it having a significant influence on the development of 
Canada’s labor constitution by its influence on government practice and 
judicial discourse.  There is little evidence, however, that it has done either. 
Only two complaints have been made against Canada.  One was refused 
because it did not involve a failure to enforce and the other was settled with 
an agreement to review the issue.  No change to the substantive law 
resulted.  Canadian courts also do not cite the NAALC as a source of 
international norms that should be used to interpret the Charter.40  
The weak enforcement of the NAALC, and especially its workers’ 
voice provisions, contrasts sharply with the strong enforcement powers for 
trade violations under the NAFTA, which permits private investors to take 
an offending government to binding arbitration by private arbitrators vested 
with the power to award damages and have its orders enforced in domestic 
courts.41  A study of investor-state disputes under NAFTA up to October 
2010 identified sixty-six cases, twenty-eight of them (43%) against 
governments in Canada.  The study found that the rate at which claims are 
being made is growing and that in the last five years, 75% of claims were 
against Canadian governments.  Of those twenty-eight claims, NAFTA 
tribunals awarded damages to investors in two.  Canada has settled three 
claims and in two it agreed to pay damages to the investor.  Tribunals have 
dismissed claims in four cases, four claims were withdrawn by the investor, 
eight claims are inactive and seven claims are active.  The cost of these 
claims has been substantial.  Canada has paid out $157 million in damages 
and incurred millions of dollars in costs.42 
 
 39. For a description, see Lance Compa, NAFTA’s Labour Side Agreement Five Years On:  
Progress and Prospects for the NAALC, 7 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (1999). 
 40. For a somewhat more hopeful assessment of NAALC’s potential, based largely on its fostering 
of labor transnationalism, see Ruth Buchanan & Rusby Chaparro, International Institutions and 
Transnational Advocacy:  The Case of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 13 UCLA 
J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129 (2008). 
 41. For critical assessments of the investment rights regime and its constitutional implications, see 
GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); David 
Schneiderman, A New Global Constitutional Order?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189 (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2011). 
 42. Scott Sinclair, NAFTA Chapter 11Investor-State Disputes, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POL’Y  
ALTERNATIVES, http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/ uploads/publications/National%20 
Office/2010/11/NAFTA%20Dispute%20Table.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2012). 
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It is more difficult to assess the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 claims 
on public policy development and democratic process.  Early tribunal 
decisions took an expansive view of investor rights, although some recent 
ones have given more weight to regulatory concerns.  Nevertheless, there is 
some evidence that the threat of investor claims has produced regulatory 
chill and the Canadian government’s recent settlement of the AbitiBowater 
claim for $130 million (based on a debatable claim that its timber and water 
rights were taken) is also likely to encourage more investor claims.43 
The difference between the protection of labor rights in the NAALC 
and the protection of investor rights under NAFTA emphasizes the different 
strengths of the two constitutionalization projects, again requiring that we 
put Canadian labor’s soft and thin regional constitution into perspective 
when discussing its current state and prospects.  It is a phenomenon that 
also characterizes EU developments.44 
We turn finally to the international scale of labor’s constitution, where 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) is the central player.  
Discussions of the ILO are fraught with difficulty and controversy.  This 
becomes immediately obvious when we ask about the thickness of labor’s 
constitution under the ILO.  For better or worse, the adoption of the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998, 
constituted a narrowing of the ILO’s ‘legislative’ agenda, 45 but at the same 
time, the Decent Work framework embraces a thicker agenda of social and 
labor rights, albeit one that, in Jill Murray’s analysis, has not been “fully 
‘constitutionalized.’”46  These difficulties are reduced to an extent if we 
focus exclusively on the workers’ voice dimension of the ILO’s labor 
constitution.  Freedom of association principles have been enshrined in the 
ILO Constitution since 1919 and the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944.  
They are further developed in Convention 87, respecting freedom of 
association and the right to organize, and Convention 98 respecting the 
right to organize and collective bargaining.  These principles have been 
elaborated by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations and the Committee on Freedom of Association 
 
 43. STEPHEN MCBRIDE, PARADIGM SHIFT:  GLOBALIZATION AND THE CANADIAN STATE 146–56 
(2d ed. 1005); SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 9, at 146–56; Sinclair, supra note 42. 
 44. See Fudge, supra note 13, at 463.  
 45. The debate is fierce.  See, e.g., Philip Alston, “Core Labour Standards” and the 
Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457 (2004); Brian 
Langille, Core Labour Rights—the True Story (Reply to Alston), 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 409 (2005). 
 46. Jill Murray, Taking Social Rights Seriously:  Is There a Case for Institutional Reform of the 
ILO?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK:  PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION 361 (Colin Fenwick & 
Tonia Novitz eds., 2010). 
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(CFA) and are identified as core rights in the Declaration.47  But it is also 
clear that the ILO does not embrace a thicker agenda of economic 
democracy insisting upon worker voice at the level of coequal control over 
the means of production.  According to Gernigon et al., the purpose of 
collective bargaining under the ILO labor constitution is “the regulation of 
terms and conditions of employment, in a broad sense, and the relations 
between the parties.”48  This “broad sense,” however, is associated with the 
bargaining over managerial prerogatives in relation to matters such as 
promotions, and dismissals, not decisions over the deployment of the means 
of production.49 
Turning next to the hardness dimension, ILO norms are essentially soft 
ones that are dealt with through a complaint process that produces 
communications directed to member governments requesting them to take 
corrective action and to keep the ILO informed of its response.  As with 
other soft law mechanisms, the more important question is whether they 
influence government action or the development of labor’s domestic 
constitution.  The answer to the former question, at least in the Canadian 
context, is that ILO findings have little sway with Canadian governments.  
Indeed, in 2002 the Committee on Freedom of Association asked its 
chairperson to hold consultations with the Canadian delegation to discuss 
its concern about the unresponsiveness of Canadian governments to its 
findings and requests.  This action did not produce any change and 
Canadian governments continue to violate ILO norms on freedom of 
association without apparent concern for their international obligations.50 
On the other hand, ILO norms have influenced the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s freedom of association jurisprudence over many years, beginning 
with Chief Justice Dickson’s dissent in one of the Labor Trilogy cases, 
Alberta Reference, where he claimed that the Charter should be presumed 
to provide at least as great a level of protection as is found in international 
human rights documents Canada has ratified.51  More recently, international 
labor norms were one of the three grounds offered by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in extending freedom of association to protect collective bargaining 
in Health Services.52  
Despite this apparent acceptance of ILO norms, questions remain 
about the court’s commitment to these principles and their application by 
 
 47. For elaboration, see Adelle Blackett, Mutual Promise:  International Labour Law and B.C. 
Health Services, 48 SUPREME COURT L. REV. 365, 369–77 (2009); Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero, & 
Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining, 139 INT’L LAB. REV. 33 (2000). 
 48. Gernigon, Oder & Guido, supra note 47, at 51. 
 49. Id. at 39–40. 
 50. DEREK FUDGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CANADA:  HUMAN RIGHT OR ILLUSION (2006). 
 51. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 349. 
 52. [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, ¶¶ 69–79. 
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ILO bodies.  The most striking recent example of the court’s selective use 
of ILO jurisprudence is in the majority judgment in the recent Fraser 
decision.  The judgment cites the CFA’s finding that the British Columbia 
legislation that was the subject of the Health Services litigation violated 
workers’ freedom of association,53 but it ignores the CFA’s interim decision 
that the Agricultural Employees Protection Act fails to provide agricultural 
workers with machinery promoting collective bargaining.54  One can only 
assume the reason for this omission is that the CFA finding would be 
“inconvenient” given the majority judgment’s refusal to draw the same 
conclusion.  But if the court is truly committed to taking ILO principles 
seriously, it cannot treat them purely instrumentally, citing those findings 
that support its conclusions and ignoring those that do not.   
In addition to the issue of selective citation of CFA decisions, the SCC 
is also not committed the interpretation of ILO norms by ILO supervisory 
bodies, but rather insists on giving its own meaning to terms like collective 
bargaining.  Their approach contrasts with the one adopted by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Demir and Baykara case, which 
also involved the right to collective bargaining.  In that case the ECtHR 
held that the right to collective bargaining must meet the standards set by 
the ILO and it deferred to the judgment of ILO supervisory bodies about 
what is that standard.55  
As with the other geographic scales, neoliberal constitutional projects 
have enormous traction and are being conducted through other international 
institutions with much greater capacity than the ILO to shape the emerging 
world economic order.56  The most important of these are the “unholy 
trinity” of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the 
WTO.57  The IMF and the World Bank have played a large role in 
promoting and enforcing macroeconomic and structural reforms that 
entrench neoliberal regimes, including privatization of state enterprises, the 
liberalization of capital markets, tax reforms that favor the wealthy, 
deregulation to create friendlier environments for investors and trade 
 
 53. 2011 S.C.C. 20, ¶ 94.  I leave aside here the question of the court’s competence to use ILO 
norms, raised by Brian Langille, Can We Rely on the ILO?, 13 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 363 (2007). 
 54.  INT’L LAB. ORG., 358TH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, ¶¶ 357–
58 (Nov. 2010), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meeting 
document/wcms_146695.pdf. 
 55. Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1345, ¶¶ 147–54, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1345.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).  The contrast between 
the SCC and the ECtHR is developed by Keith Ewing & John Hendy, Giving Life to the ILO—Two 
Cheers for the SCC, in CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA (Fay Faraday et al. eds., 2012). 
 56. See STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 131–35 (2d ed. 
2008).  A separate mapping of new constitutionalism would be necessary to provide greater 
specification of its dimensions. 
 57. See generally RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY:  THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO (2d ed. 
2009). 
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liberalization.  While these reforms create a global neoliberal order, the 
direct impact of the IMF is on borrowers who face “structural 
conditionality” in order to gain access to IMF loans and since wealthier 
developed countries, like Canada, are not in the position of having to rely 
on the IMF, we will not consider its system of rules and their enforcement 
here.58  Rather our focus is on the WTO. 
The WTO was created in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations that lasted from 1986 to 1994.  The motivation to create the 
WTO was to strengthen global free trade, which had made limited advances 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in 1994, 
largely in the area of tariff reductions.  This goal was to be achieved by 
creating a stronger institutional structure with a wider mandate and greater 
enforcement powers than had existed under the GATT.  In addition to 
achieving further reductions on tariffs, the Uruguay Round introduced new 
rules regarding nontariff barriers, which could potentially include an array 
of local, provincial or national regulatory programs as well as import 
licenses and quotas and government subsidies, and established agreements 
on trade in services, intellectual property rights and trade-related 
investment.  As a result, the WTO regime reached far more deeply into 
national economic policies than had the GATT.59  In my terms, the WTO 
regime has become thicker. 
The regime also became harder.  A system of adjudication existed 
under the GATT, but it was constrained by rules that gave defendants the 
ability to delay or block complaints.  Under the WTO’s more powerful 
mechanisms, members can no longer block the establishment of a tribunal, 
the rulings of the tribunal are binding, and retaliatory trade sanctions can be 
imposed if a country is found not to have complied with a tribunal decision. 
Unlike NAFTA, under the WTO only states, however, have standing to 
bring complaints against other members.60 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide an assessment of the 
direct effects of WTO dispute resolution on the capacity of states generally, 
or on Canada in particular, to regulate or pursue development strategies that 
do not comply with neoliberal policy prescriptions.  Froese concludes his 
study of the impact of WTO trade litigation on Canada with the cautious 
observation that: “[I]ts influence on domestic politics is only beginning to 
 
 58. For recent critical assessments, see, PEET, id.; Nitsan Chorev & Sarah Babb, The Crisis of Neo-
Liberalism and the Future of International Institutions:  A Comparison of the IMF and the WTO, 38 
THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY 459 (2009).  For an account of the inner dynamics that shaped the IMF’s turn 
toward neo-liberalism, see JEFFREY M. CHWIEROTH, CAPITAL IDEAS:  THE IMF AND THE RISE OF 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION (2010).  Finally, for an older critique of the IMF and World Bank, see 
MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY (1999). 
 59. Chorev & Babb, supra note 58, at 470–71. 
 60. For a more detailed description, see FROESE, supra note 8, at 147–54.  
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be understood.  However, these cases suggest that the WTO has less direct 
influence on policy than do domestic groups.  Its influence is felt in more 
subtle ways.  As an institution, it is certainly a game changer.”61 
He does not elaborate on the indirect influence the WTO has on 
domestic policy and on the capacity of domestic groups to reshape that 
policy, perhaps because it is probably impossible to isolate a specific 
indirect WTO effect.62  When viewed as part of a larger international 
project to constitutionalize a neoliberal social structure of accumulation, it 
is fair to conclude that its indirect effects weigh in the direction of 
strengthening the hand of capital, even if aspects of the WTO still respect a 
limited right of states to adopt somewhat different regulatory models and to 
enact measures protecting the environment and public health.63 
This is not to say that the ILO is unable to influence these other 
institutions and gain some commitment on their part to the protection of 
core labor rights in their programs.  Indeed, there has been some 
cooperation between the ILO and the WTO.  For example, in the 1996 
Singapore Declaration, the members of the WTO renewed their 
commitment to core labor standards and identified the ILO as the body 
responsible “to set and deal with” these standards.  The Declaration went on 
to state the WTO view that core labor standards are best promoted through 
trade liberalization, that it rejects the use of labor standards for protectionist 
purposes and that it recognizes the legitimacy of low-wage labor as a 
comparative advantage.  The politics of bringing labor rights into the WTO 
system are complicated and it is far from clear that even if a labor rights 
clause were adopted it would be effective, since there is no place for unions 
or nongovernmental organizations to make complaints, and even if a 
complaint were made by a member, presumably it would have to 
demonstrate that the violation of core labor standards created as unfair trade 
advantage.  In any event, to date, the WTO has resisted further engagement 
with the labor rights issue64 and its pursuit within the WTO really involves 
pushing the organization in the opposite direction of its primary agenda.  As 
Richard McIntyre notes: 
Thus, in the end, the campaign for labour standards is not purely about 
labour standards but about creating a wedge for bringing the concerns of 
working people to the tables where the great issues of globalization are 
 
 61. Id. at 135. 
 62. Critical assessments of the impact of the WTO on workers’ rights tend to focus more on trade 
liberalization than on particular WTO decisions.  For example, see STEVEN SHRYBMAN, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 93–109 (2001). 
 63. For a more positive review, see TRISH KELLY, THE IMPACT OF THE WTO (2007).  For a 
negative view, see PEET, supra note 57, at 203–16; MCBRIDE, supra note 43, at 156–65. 
 64. PEET, supra note 57, at 216–23; Gerrard Greenfield, Core Labor Standards in the WTO, 5 
WORKINGUSA 9 (Summer 2001). 
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decided.  That we have so much difficulty doing so must be attributed 
both to contemporary moral convention and class interest.65 
Chart 1 below graphically depicts a simplified map of labor’s and 
capital’s constitution.  Two features are notable.  First, as labor’s 
constitution becomes thicker at larger geographic scales it also becomes 
softer.  Narrow labor rights under the Charter are judicially enforceable, 
while for all practical purposes the somewhat broader labor rights under the 
NAALC are subject to low level ministerial consultations, and the ILO’s 
even broader labor rights are reviewable by a committee that can make 
findings.  The second feature is that what I have called capital’s constitution 
tends to cluster in the harder and thicker quadrant of the map and hang 
above Canada’s labor constitution at every geographic scale.  I have not 
attempted to map out differences in thickness for the national, regional and 
international scales of capital’s constitution, but I think it is clear that they 
cover a much broader range of issues and cut more deeply into state 
sovereignty than does labor’s constitution.  They establish the structural 
conditions within which labor rights must operate.  As far as hardness goes, 
apart from Charter rights, which are equally juridified for labor and capital, 
capital’s constitution is much harder at every scale in the sense that there 
are dispute resolution mechanisms that result in enforceable judgments.  
Indeed, the trend has been to strengthen the enforceability of capital’s 
constitution, as we have seen in recent developments in free-trade 
federalism at the national scale, the coming into force of NAFTA in 1994 
and the establishment of the WTO in 1995. 
  
 
 65. RICHARD P. MCINTYRE, ARE WORKER RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 175 (2008). 
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Moreover, all of this takes place within a partially constitutionalized 
neoliberal social structure of accumulation, which exerts a stronger pull on 
labor’s constitution than labor’s constitution exerts on capital’s constitution.  
These relationships are depicted in Chart 2. 
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III. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
This Article proposed a scheme for mapping labor’s constitution(s) on 
three dimensions: its thickness, its hardness, and its geographic scale.  
Taking the case of Canada, it found that labor’s constitution becomes 
thicker as its geographic scale becomes larger.  It, however, also found that 
as labor’s constitution becomes thicker, it also becomes softer.  It also 
emphasized that the project of constitutionalizing labor rights must be 
considered against the background of the project of constitutionalizing 
capital rights.  Again, using the Canadian case, the Article argues that at 
every geographic scale, capital’s constitution is thicker than labor’s and 
that, with the exception of Charter rights, capital’s constitution is also 
harder.  Moreover, while there is a clear trend toward hardening capital’s 
constitution by strengthening enforcement procedures, there is no evident 
trend toward the hardening of labor’s constitution, again except at the level 
of the Charter, where labor rights, to the extent they are recognized, are 
hard.   
In this final Part I want to briefly raise a few questions that follow 
from this analysis.  The first relates to the thickness of labor’s constitution.  
For the most part, labor’s constitutionalization project has been limited to 
seeking protection for the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and 
strike.  In the larger scheme of things, these might seem to be modest goals.  
The importance of seeking their protection in an era in which neoliberal 
governments are stripping away these rights, however, cannot be 
understated.  Just recently in Canada the federal government threatened to 
pass back to work legislation before a strike at an airline commenced, 
passed back to work legislation ending a lockout by the employer in which 
it imposed a wage settlement less than the employer’s last offer, and 
stopped flight attendants from striking by invoking a provision that limits 
industrial conflict where it puts the health and safety of Canadians in 
serious and immediate danger.66   
Yet several questions remain.  First, we might ask whether the project 
of constitutionalizing a thick worker voice—something like Sinzheimer’s 
economic constitution—should be revived, notwithstanding the 
impossibility of its realization in the foreseeable future.  The question may 
be significant because the answer can shape the way the demand for 
freedom of association is framed.  The dominant approach has been to 
frame freedom of association as a human right, with the legal connotation 
that it limits governmental attacks on associational freedoms and requires 
 
 66. Jim Stanford, Raitt’s Three Principles Only Run One Way, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 2, 2011, at 
A19. 
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public support for their enjoyment in the face of employer resistance.  This 
is a defensive approach that secures a space for the exercise of associational 
rights within a largely untransformed neoliberal social structure of 
accumulation.  Within this framework, a revival of the economic democracy 
project is unnecessary.  Indeed, the linking of associational freedoms to an 
economic democracy frame might be strategically harmful because it will 
potentially alienate judges whose support for constitutionalizing association 
rights is crucial.  Thus it is best to argue that labor’s constitution can be 
realized without significantly disturbing the current economic order. 
Alternatively, we might want to consider whether too much is 
conceded by abandoning the economic democracy project, especially if the 
evidence suggests severe limits on the extent to which labor’s associational 
rights can be effectively constitutionalized as human rights in a neoliberal 
social structure of accumulation that is in the process of being 
constitutionalized.  The Canadian case suggests there are significant limits 
on what can be accomplished at the national scale, especially if the project 
is pursued primarily through litigation.  On the regional level, the North 
American experience is also not very encouraging either, but the story may 
be different for the Europe and the Antipodes.   
Additionally, if popular mobilization is required to make associational 
rights meaningful on any geographic scale, is a human rights frame 
adequate for the task, or is it, perhaps, even counterproductive because it 
embraces a liberal discourse of rights that potentially undermines labor’s 
capacity for class-based approaches to advancing workers’ rights?67  Does 
this require, as Sinzheimer argued, that we recognize collective 
representation is necessary because under capitalism class conflict is 
inherent and, therefore, the advancement of workers’ interests as 
individuals is bound up with the improvement of their class?  And, if we are 
really serious that the full development of human potential should be the 
central aim of a just society, must workers’ voice be thickly 
constitutionalized so that their labor is no longer alienated through the 
contract of employment to an employer who determines how it will be 
deployed to expand exchange value, leaving workers with constrained 
opportunities to develop themselves as full human beings through their 
work and through collective deliberations over what use values are needed 
and how they will be produced and distributed? 
 
 67. For arguments along these lines, see Larry Savage, Workers’ Rights As Human Rights:  
Organized Labor and Rights Discourse in Canada, 34 LAB. STUD. J. 8 (2009); Kevin Kolben, Labor 
Rights As Human Rights?, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2009–2010); Nelson Lichtenstein, The Rights 
Revolution, 12 NEW LAB. FORUM 61 (2003); David Brody, Labour Rights As Human Rights:  A Reality 
Check, 39 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 601 (2001). 
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All talk of economic democracy must seem hopelessly utopian in an 
age when the project of creating a market-based “stark utopia”68 as Polanyi 
described it, is so far advanced.  But if Polanyi is also right that an 
unregulated market order will produce severe dysfunctional social, 
economic and ecological consequences that over time will generate large-
scale social resistance, then perhaps the project of retrieving Sinzheimer’s 
thick labor constitution is relevant.   
Another issue for further reflection is the geographic scale of labor’s 
constitution.  As we have seen, in Canada the labor movement has worked 
primarily at the national and the international scale, through the Charter 
and the ILO, to promote its “labor rights are human rights” agenda.  The 
NAALC has pretty much fallen by the wayside, although transnational 
activism, aimed largely at failures to enforce Mexican labor law, has 
increased.69  Australia also seems to have followed this course, presumably 
because of the absence of a regional framework for pursuing labor rights, 
while in the United Kingdom its membership in the EU provides a very 
different opportunity structure.70  While national labor movements may 
focus on what works best from within their own jurisdiction, larger 
questions remain about the implications of the uneven geographic 
development of labor’s constitution and whether significant differences can 
be sustained before downward pressures begin to operate through 
international labor arbitrage.  Of course, the ILO and regional instruments 
exist in part to push in the opposite direction and strengthen national labor 
constitutions, and transnational labor activism supports those efforts, but it 
is an open question whether these institutions and activists have the 
capacity to do so.  Thinking about how to build these capacities and 
strengthen labor’s constitutions in a regionally and globally coordinated 
way are important and difficult questions for a transnational voices at work 
project.71 
Finally, we might want to inquire more deeply into mechanisms for 
hardening labor rights.  For the most part, we tend to associate hardness 
with judicial enforcement, putting courts at the centre of the project.  Apart 
from the historical antipathy of most courts towards collective labor rights 
 
 68. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 3 (1957). 
 69. See generally Buchanan & Chaparro, supra note 40. 
 70. Colin Fenwick, Workers’ Human Rights in Australia, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK:  
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION 41 (Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz eds., 2010); ACL Davies, 
Workers’ Human Rights in English Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK:  PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND 
REGULATION 171 (Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz eds., 2010). 
 71. For some interesting reflections on the difficulties of labor rights transnational activism on, see 
Gay Seidman, Deflated Citizenship:  Labor Rights in a Global Era, in PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE:  
GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE CITIZENSHIP GAP 109 (Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds., 
2004). 
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and the question of whether that can be overcome in an environment in 
which neoliberalism is ascendant, there is also the question, mentioned 
earlier, of the impact of pursuing labor rights through litigation on the 
development of popular mobilization strategies that might be more 
successful in the long run.  As well, there are overarching questions of the 
courts’ democratic legitimacy and its institutional capacity to develop and 
enforce constitutionalized economic and social rights of any kind.72  It is 
interesting that capital’s constitution is increasingly enforced by private 
arbitration, thereby reducing democratic accountability and exacerbating 
concerns about democratic legitimacy.  Can labor’s constitution be 
hardened without resort to traditional mechanisms of judicial review, but in 
a manner that builds democratic capacities? 
 
 
 72. For a thoughtful overview of the literature and a discussion of these issues in the context of 
South Africa, see Brian Ray, Policentrism, Political Mobilization, and the Promise of Socioeconomic 
Rights, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 151 (2009). 
